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THE ROLE OF FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW:
UNCONSCIONABILITY, UNEXPECTED
CIRCUMSTANCES, INTERPRETATION,
MISTAKE, AND NONPERFORMANCE
Melvin Aron Eisenberg *
It is often asserted that contract law is based on strict liability, not
fault. This assertion is incorrect. Fault is a basic building block of
contract law, and pervades the field. Some areas of contract law,
such as unconscionability, are largely fault based. Other areas,
such as interpretation, include sectors that are fault based in sig-
nificant part. Still other areas, such as liability for nonperformance,
superficially appear to rest on strict liability, but actually rest in
significant part on the fault of breaking a promise without sufficient
excuse. Contract law discriminates between two types of fault: the
violation of strong moral norms, such as the prohibition of decep-
tion, and the violation of somewhat weaker moral norms, such as
the requirement of due care. In some areas of contract law, one type
of fault dominates. Where both types of fault are relevant, one
party's violation of a strong moral norm will normally override the
other party's violation of a weaker moral norm. Fault is pervasive
in contract law because it should be. One part of the human condi-
tion is that we hold both policy and moral values; law cannot
escape this condition. Moreover, if moral obligation and fault were
removed from contract law, the contracting system would be much
less efficient. The efficiency of the contracting system rests on a tri-
pod whose legs are legal remedies, reputational effects, and the
internalization of social norms-in particular, the moral norm of
promise keeping. All three legs are necessary to ensure the reliabil-
ity, and therefore the efficiency, of the contracting system.
INTRODUCTION
The Second Restatement of Contracts states: "Contract liability is strict
liability. It is an accepted maxim that pacta sunt servanda, contracts are to
be kept. The obligor is therefore liable in damages for breach of contract
even if he is without fault . . . ."' Similarly, Farnsworth's treatise states that
"contract law is, in its essential design, a law of strict liability, and the
* Koret Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); Stephen and Barbara
Friedman Visiting Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, introductory note (1981).
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accompanying system of remedies operates without regard to fault. ' These
statements, and many others like them, are incorrect.
As a normative matter, fault should be a building block of contract law.
One part of the human condition is that we hold many moral values con-
cerning right and wrong. Contract law cannot escape this condition.
Accordingly, the basic principle that tells us how to make the best possible
rules of contract law-or any law, for that matter-must accommodate not
only policy and empirical propositions, but also moral values, including val-
ues concerning various types of fault. This principle is as follows:
First. If, but only if, appropriate conditions are satisfied, and
subject to appropriate constraints, the law should effectuate the ob-
jectives of parties to promissory transactions.
Second. The rules that determine the conditions to, and the con-
straints on, the legal effectuation of the objectives of parties to
promissory transactions, and the way in which those objectives are
to be ascertained, should consist of those rules that best take into
account all relevant moral, policy, and empirical propositions.
Based on this principle, it should not be surprising that fault is a perva-
sive element in contract law. Some areas of contract law, such as
unconscionability, are almost entirely fault based. Other areas, including
interpretation, include sectors that are fault based in significant part. Still
other areas, such as liability for nonperformance, might superficially appear
to be based on strict liability, but can best be understood as resting in sig-
nificant part on fault.
In this Article, I will discuss some important areas of contract law in
which fault should and does figure very heavily. The point is not to exhaust
the areas in which fault should and does play an important role, but to illus-
trate how contract law is fault based to a significant extent, and to examine
the different ways in which fault figures in contract law.
Fault comes in different flavors and degrees. For contract-law purposes,
fault can be divided into the violation of strong moral norms, such as the
norm against lying, and the violation of somewhat weaker moral norms-in
particular, the norm that an actor should give due regard to the legitimate
interests of others. The major type of contract-law fault in the latter category
is negligence, or lack of due care. In this Article I will discuss the role of
different kinds of fault in five important areas of contract law: unconscion-
ability, unexpected circumstances, interpretation, mistake, and liability for
nonperformance.
2. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 195-96 (3d ed.
2004).
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I. UNCONSCIONABILITY
One of the most important developments in modem contract law is the
emergence of the principle that an unconscionable contract or term is unen-
forceable.3 Traces of that principle can be found in some older cases , and
equity courts have long reviewed contracts for fairness when equitable relief
was sought,5 but unconscionability was not a recognized principle under
classical contract law. The position of contract law changed radically begin-
ning in the 1960s, following the lead of section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which provides that if any contract or contract clause is
unconscionable, a court may refuse to enforce the contract or clause or limit
the application of the clause to avoid an unconscionable result. Section 2-
302 was adopted by almost every state, and the principle it embodies
has been embraced in other uniform acts,6 the Second Restatement of
Contracts,7 the Second Restatement of Property,8 and the case law.9 How-
ever, the meaning and reach of the unconscionability principle is still not
fully established.
Early on, an effort was made to reconcile the unconscionability principle
with the bargain principle-the principle of classical contract law that bar-
gains are enforceable according to their terms, without regard to fairness.'0 A
major step in this direction was a distinction, drawn by Arthur Leff and later
adopted by many courts and commentators, between procedural and sub-
stantive unconscionability." Essentially, Leff defined procedural
unconscionability as fault or unfairness in the bargaining process, and sub-
stantive unconscionability as fault or unfairness in the bargaining outcome,
even if unaccompanied by unfairness of process. 2
Procedural unconscionability is easy to reconcile with the bargain prin-
ciple. That principle rests in significant part on the predicate that private
actors are the best judges of their own utility. This predicate, however, only
justifies the application of the bargain principle where both parties act
3. For convenience, hereinafter I will use the term "contract" to include contract terms.
4. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948); McClure v. Raben,
33 N.E. 275 (Ind. 1893); Richey v. Richey, 179 NW. 830 (Iowa 1920); Balt. Humane Impartial
Soc'y v. Pierce, 60 A. 277 (Md. 1905); Mersereau v. Simon, 8 N.Y.S.2d 534 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938).
5. See, e.g., Loeb v. Wilson, 61 Cal. Rptr. 377 (Ct. App. 1967); Schlegel v. Moorhead, 553
P.2d 1009 (Mont. 1976); McKinnon v. Benedict, 157 N.W.2d 665 (Wis. 1968).
6. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108 (1974); UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND
TENANT ACT § 1.303(a)(l) (1974); UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 4 (1971).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PRop.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 5.6 (1977).
9. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(relying in part on analogy to the 1962 version of § 2-302).
10. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 741
(1982).
11. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 485, 487 (1967).
12. Id.
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voluntarily and are fully informed and the bargaining process is fair. Where
the bargaining process is unconscionable-unfair-a major predicate of the
bargain principle is not satisfied, and that principle therefore cannot prop-
erly be applied to enforce the contract.
In contrast, it may seem difficult to reconcile the bargain principle with a
regime that allows judicial review of contracts for pure substantive uncon-
scionability, because under such a regime a contract could be found
unconscionable even if the bargaining process was fair. Accordingly, the ef-
fect, if not the purpose, of the distinction between procedural and substantive
unconscionability was to suggest that purely substantive unconscionability
should be insufficient to render a contract unconscionable.
The distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability is
useful, but it takes us only so far, and in some ways clouds the relevant is-
sues. Often the distinction will be artificial, because unfairness in the
bargaining process will be significant only if the resulting bargain is unfair.
Conversely, under some circumstances extracting an unfair contract will be
unfair in itself. Finally, the distinction does not address the crucial question,
how should it be determined whether a contract is procedurally or substan-
tively unconscionable?
The answer is that with the possible exception of pure substantive un-
conscionability, two elements-a predicate and a principle-should figure
in a determination of unconscionability. The predicate is the nature of the
market on which the contract was made. Contracts made on competitive
markets will rarely be unconscionable. However, when contracts are made
off-market or on markets that are not competitive, the stage is set for uncon-
scionability. The principle is that unconscionability normally turns on
whether the contract involved moral fault on the part of the promisee. Re-
gardless of the nature of the market on which a contract is made, a contract
will not be unconscionable without the element of moral fault.
A. Markets
In this Article, I will use the term "competitive market" to mean a mar-
ket that is either perfectly or reasonably competitive. A perfectly
competitive market has four characteristics: a homogeneous commodity;
perfect, cost-free, and readily available information; productive resources
that are sufficiently mobile that pricing decisions readily influence their al-
location; and participants whose market share is so small that none can
affect the terms on which the commodity is sold, so that each participant
takes those terms as given." A reasonably competitive market is a market
whose characteristics approximate those of a perfectly competitive market.
There are relatively few perfectly competitive markets, but many reasonably
competitive markets.
13. See, e.g., EDWIN G. DOLAN, BASIC MICROECONOMICS 160 (1983). For ease of exposition,
I will use the term "price" to include all the terms offered by a seller.
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Now assume a perfectly competitive market, and let the parties to a bar-
gain be S, a plaintiff-seller, and B, a defendant-buyer. Given the conditions
of a perfect market, the contract price will be the market price. This price
will rarely if ever be unconscionable, since in our society a perfectly com-
petitive market is generally regarded as a fair mechanism to set prices
because: (1) By normal measures of value, the contract price will be equal
to the benefit S has agreed to confer upon B. (2) S would not voluntarily
have agreed to transfer the commodity to B at any lower price, because if B
had not agreed to pay the market price, S could have sold it to another buyer
at that price. (3) Since cost-free information is readily available on such
markets, the parties to the transaction will almost always be fully informed.
(4) The contract price will normally equal the seller's marginal cost plus a
normal profit.
The price in a perfectly competitive market will also normally be effi-
cient. First, given that pricing decisions on such a market readily influence
the allocation of productive resources, a prospect of above-normal profits
will provide an incentive to increase supply, leading to an increase in capac-
ity and a new and lower equilibrium price that yields only normal profits. In
contrast, to the extent the price is kept from rising to the equilibrium or
market price, there is an incentive to decrease capacity by reallocating re-
sources to other uses and not replacing depleted capital stock. Second, if
perfect competition prevails, demand for the commodity would exceed the
supply at any price less than the market price. Some mechanism other than
price would therefore be required for rationing the supply among competing
buyers, and the supply would not be allocated to its highest-valued uses as
measured by the amounts competing buyers are willing to pay-assuming,
at least, that income is either distributed optimally or can best be redistrib-
uted by techniques other than price, such as taxation and subsidy.
These effects are scaled down where a market is only reasonably com-
petitive. For example, because commodities sold on a reasonably
competitive market normally will not be homogeneous and information is
not cost free, exploitation is a possibility. In general, however, transactions
on reasonably competitive markets are unlikely to be unconscionable, for
many of the same reasons that transactions on a perfectly competitive mar-
ket will rarely if ever be unconscionable.
In this connection, however, it is important to distinguish between com-
modities and the markets on which they trade. In the case of commodities
that are sold on competitive markets, contracts are normally made on physi-
cal or virtual markets in which the public can readily participate. However, a
commodity that is normally sold on a public market may occasionally be
sold privately, that is, away from any public market that is readily available
to both parties. Where that occurs, the contract should be treated as having
been made off-market, even though the commodity may also be traded on a
competitive market. Unconscionability is most likely to be found where a
transaction occurs either off-market or on a public market that is not com-
petitive.
1417June 20091
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B. Moral Fault
In short, contracts made on perfectly competitive markets will rarely if
ever be unconscionable, and contracts made on reasonably competitive mar-
kets will not often be unconscionable. However, the converse is not true: a
contract that is made off-market or on a noncompetitive market is not un-
conscionable for that reason alone. Instead, such a contract will be
unconscionable only if it involves moral fault on the part of the promisee.
Moral fault, for contract-law purposes, should normally mean social moral-
ity-moral standards that are rooted in aspirations for the community as a
whole and that, on the basis of an appropriate methodology, can fairly be
said to have substantial support in the community, can be derived from
norms that have such support, or appear as if they would have such support.
The importance of moral fault in this connection is made explicit in
many civil-code and civil-code-based rules that operate like the unconscion-
ability principle. For example, the German Civil Code provides:
[A] legal transaction is void by which a person, by exploiting the predica-
ment, inexperience, lack of sound judgment or considerable weakness of
will of another, causes himself or a third party, in exchange for an act of
performance, to be promised or granted pecuniary advantages which are
clearly disproportionate to the performance.
1 4
Similarly, the Principles of European Contract Law provide:
(1) A party may avoid a contract if, at the time of the conclusion of the
contract:
(a) it was ... in economic distress or had urgent needs, was improvident,
ignorant, inexperienced or lacking in bargaining skill, and
(b) the other party knew or ought to have known of this and, given the cir-
cumstances and purpose of the contract, took advantage of the first
party's situation in a way which was grossly unfair or took an excessive
benefit. "
Although the essential role of moral fault is not as explicit under
American law as it is under some civil-code and civil-code-based rules, it is
implicit in the concept of unconscionability: what kind of conduct is not
conscionable must depend on what kind of conduct involves moral fault.
This is not to say that a contract that involves any moral fault at all is neces-
sarily unconscionable. So, for example, depending on the circumstances, a
seller's use of mildly manipulative talk, while unfair, might not be uncon-
scionable. Moral fault comes in different degrees, and the term
unconscionable suggests a significant degree of moral fault.
14. BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, as amended, § 138(2)
(F.R.G.) (emphasis added), translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_bgb/index.html; accord Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht [OR] [Code of Obligations]
Mar. 30, 1911, as amended, art. 21(1) (Switz.).
15. Principles of European Contract Law art. 4:109(1) (1998) (emphasis added); accord
UNIDROIT Principles of Int'l Commercial Contracts art. 3.10(1) (2004).
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II. UNEXPECTED CIRCUMSTANCES
I now turn to the area of unexpected circumstances, in which the most
salient type of fault is lack of due care. A basic rule in this area is that relief
will not be granted where the adversely affected party is at fault for having
caused the relevant event. For example, the Second Restatement provides:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made impractica-
ble without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to
render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circum-
stances indicate the contrary.16
Under this rule, fault operates in a binary fashion, like an on/off switch,
to bar the adversely affected party from employing an unexpected-
circumstances excuse that she would otherwise be entitled to invoke. How-
ever, there is another way to view this problem; fault might instead operate
on a continuum, like a dimmer switch. A promisor's fault in causing the un-
expected circumstance may be slight or severe. At one extreme, the
promisor's fault may consist of reckless conduct or gross negligence. At the
other extreme, the promisor's fault may consist only of minor negligence.
The location of the promisor's conduct on the fault continuum should affect
the promisee's remedy. Where a promisor would be excused by reason of
unexpected circumstances but for her fault and her fault is minor, a reason-
able accommodation is to require the promisor to pay reliance damages-
the costs that the promisee incurred in reliance on the promise-but not ex-
pectation damages. The promisor should be required to pay reliance
damages, because she is at fault and her fault has caused the promisee to be
worse off than he was before the promise was made. However, the promisor
should be excused from paying expectation damages, because but for her
fault she would be excused from liability; the fault is minor; and the pro-
misee will have no loss in the usual sense of that term-that is, no
diminution in his precontract wealth-after he is compensated for his costs
by reliance damages. Accordingly, section 261 of the Second Restatement
(quoted above) is complemented by section 272(2): "[ijn any case governed
by the rules stated in this Chapter [on impracticability and frustration], if
those rules ... will not avoid injustice, the court may grant relief on such
terms as justice requires including protection of the parties' reliance inter-
ests." 1
7
A series of four important decisions by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court exemplifies this remedial approach. The decisions all arose out of a
contract between John Bowen Company, a general contractor, and the
Massachusetts Department of Health, acting with the approval of the State
Public Building Commission. The contract provided for the construction of
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981) (emphasis added); see also id2
§ 266(1) (existing impracticability); id. § 265 (discharge by supervening frustration).
17. Id. § 272(2).
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the Lemuel Shattuck Hospital in Boston." The series began with Gifford v.
Commissioner of Public Health," which concerned the validity of the con-
tract. This case did not involve unexpected circumstances, but it set the stage
for the other three decisions. Under a Massachusetts statute, contracts like
the one at issue had to be put out to bid and awarded to the lowest qualified
bidder. The contract was awarded to Bowen, but another bidder, Slotnik,
challenged the award. The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that in setting
out the components of its bid, Bowen had failed to fully comply with the
statute, and that if Bowen had fully complied, Slotnik would have been the
lowest qualified bidder. Accordingly, the court cancelled the award of the
contract to Bowen. The next three decisions in the series involved suits
against Bowen by subcontractors who had entered into contracts with
Bowen before Bowen's contract with the Department of Health was can-
celled in Gifford.
The first of these decisions, M. Ahern Co. v. John Bowen Co.,2° was an
action by a plumbing subcontractor, Ahern, for unpaid labor and materials
furnished on the hospital project before Bowen's contract was cancelled.
The court began by pointing out that although Bowen was not liable for
Ahern's expectation damages by reason of the cancellation of Bowen's con-
tract with the Department of Health, that was not the end of the case. The
courts, it said, have not been deterred "from giving recovery in cases of ex-
cusable impossibility for such performance as has been received., 2' This was
nothing new; it is hornbook law that even where unexpected circumstances
excuse expectation damages, they do not excuse restitution for the value of a
benefit conferred.2 However, the court rejected unjust-enrichment theory as
the basis of recovery for what was furnished in suits like that brought by
Ahem. The court further held that "[i]t is no longer necessary to find impli-
cations of a contract to support recovery.' 23 Instead, the court said, recovery
was to be based on "what the court holds to be fair and just in the unantici-
pated circumstances. 24 In Ahern itself, the court concluded that what was
fair and just turned at least in part on the role Bowen's fault had played in
making the contract with Ahern impossible to perform:
This is not a case where the defendant stands fully apart, as the plaintiff
does, from the circumstances which caused the unexpected destruction of
the subject matter of the contract. The defendant did those things with re-
spect to the subbids discussed in Gifford v. Commissioner of Public Health
which caused its bid to appear the lowest, although in fact it was not. The
18. The hospital is alternatively named in the four decisions as "a chronic diseases hospital
in Boston" and the "Chronic Disease Hospital and Nurses' Home."
19. 105 N.E.2d 476 (Mass. 1952).
20. 133 N.E.2d 484 (Mass. 1956).
21. Id. at 485.
22. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 377.
23. Ahem, 133 N.E.2d at 486.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
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Gifford decision has held that what the defendant did was not properly
done. Even though we assume, as the defendant urges here, that it acted in
good faith, and in respects as to which the prescribed course was not clear,
the fact is that its actions, in a field where it had a choice, had a significant
part in bringing about the subsequent critical events-the awarding to it of
an apparent contract which turned out to be void and the ensuing decision
of this court. In the circumstances it is plain that this is not a case of fully
excusable impossibility.'
The next decision in the Lemuel Shattuck Hospital series was Boston
Plate & Window Glass Co. v. John Bowen Co.26 In this case, Boston Plate, a
subcontractor, had entered into subcontracts with Bowen to furnish glass,
glazing, and miscellaneous nonferrous metalwork for the hospital.27 Subse-
quently, Bowen notified Boston Plate that it could not proceed with the
subcontracts. At that time, Boston Plate had not actually begun its work, but
it had made preparations to do so and had incurred expenses in connection
with those preparations. However, Boston Plate sued Bowen only for expec-
tation damages for breach of the subcontracts, not for reliance damages
based on its preparatory work. Bowen argued that it was not liable on the
subcontracts, because the decision in Gifford rendered performance of the
contracts impossible. The court agreed.
To summarize the story so far: the occurrence of an unexpected circum-
stance may excuse the promisor from liability for expectation damages, even
where the promisor bears some fault for the occurrence. However, the pro-
misor will not be excused from liability for what the promisee furnished
under the contract before the occurrence of the unexpected circumstance.
The concept of "furnished," for this purpose, is elastic and depends, in
whole or in part, on what is fair and just under the circumstances.
This story leaves open the treatment of costs that a promisee has in-
curred in cases where the promisee had not furnished anything before the
occurrence of the unexpected circumstance. That issue was the subject of
the last decision in the Lemuel Shattuck Hospital series, Albre Marble &
Tile Co. v. John Bowen Co.2 Albre, another subcontractor, had contracts
with Bowen for the installation of marble and tile for the hospital.2 9 Bowen
refused to perform its contracts with Albre on the ground that performance
had been made impossible by the Health Department's cancellation of its
contract with Bowen, and Albre sued Bowen in four counts.
The first and second counts sought expectation damages for Bowen's
breach of Albre's contracts. Bowen pleaded impossibility, and the court dis-
missed these two counts on summary judgment.0
25. Id.
26. 141 N.E.2d 715 (Mass. 1957).
27. Id. at 716.
28. 155 N.E.2d 437 (Mass. 1959).
29. Id. at 439.
30. Id.
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Albre's third and fourth counts sought to recover the value of its work
and labor under its contracts, which consisted of the " 'preparation of sam-
ples, shop drawings, tests and affidavits'" rather than labor or materials
furnished in the construction of the hospital.3 To put this differently, Albre
sought reliance damages in its third and fourth counts. Accordingly, a major
issue in the case was whether a promisee could recover reliance damages
against a promisor who was excused from paying expectation damages by
reason of unexpected circumstances. The court concluded that even though
Bowen was not sufficiently at fault to be liable for expectation damages, it
was sufficiently at fault to be liable for reliance damages:
Although the matter of denial of reliance expenditures in impossibility
situations seems to have been discussed but little in judicial opinions, it
has, however, been the subject of critical comment by scholars. In England
the recent frustrated contracts legislation provides that the court may grant
recovery for expenditures in reliance on the contract or in preparation to
perform it where it appears "just to do so having regard to all the circum-
stances of the case."
... [T]his is not a case of mere impossibility by reason of a supervening
act.... Although the defendant's conduct was not so culpable as to render
it liable for breach of contract, nevertheless, it was a contributing factor to
a loss sustained by the plaintiff which as between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant the latter ought to bear to the extent herein permitted.32
In short, the principle, supported by section 272(2) of the Second
Restatement, and exemplified by the Lemuel Shattuck Hospital series, is that
where the occurrence of an unexpected circumstance would warrant judicial
relief except that the promisor is proven to have been at fault, and the fault
was minor, the promisor normally should be relieved from liability for expec-
tation damages, but not reliance damages. Of course, if the promisor's fault is
more extreme, she will not be able to set up an unexpected-circumstances de-
fense and therefore normally will be liable for expectation damages.
III. INTERPRETATION
In the area of unconscionability, the most salient kind of fault is moral
fault. In the area of unexpected circumstances, the most salient kind of fault
is lack of due care. In some other areas of contract law, both kinds of fault
play a role. The play of different kinds and degrees of fault in a single area
is well illustrated by four central principles of interpretation.
Principle I. If contracting parties subjectively attached different
meanings to an expression, and the two meanings were not equally
reasonable, the more reasonable meaning prevails.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 440-41 (citations omitted).
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Principle I is adopted in section 201(2)(b) of the Second Restatement:
Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agree-
ment or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning
attached by one of them if at the time the agreement was made .. that
party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the
other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first
party.
33
Principle I is based in large part on fault. If A and B engage in the forma-
tion of a contract, A is negligent if she uses an expression that she should
realize would lead a reasonable person in B's position to understand that A
attaches a given meaning, x, to the expression, when in fact A attaches
meaning y. If B attaches meaning x, and as a result suffers wasted reliance
or the defeat of a legitimate expectation when A insists on meaning y, A
should be liable to B.
Principle II. If contracting parties subjectively attached differ-
ent meanings to an expression and the two meanings were equally
reasonable, neither meaning prevails.
Principle II is associated with Raffles v. Wichelhaus (the Peerless case).34
In Peerless, the seller agreed to sell the buyer 125 bales of Surat cotton to
arrive at Liverpool "ex [ship] 'Peerless' from Bombay."3 There were, how-
ever, two ships named Peerless that sailed from Bombay: one sailed in
October, and one in December. The seller meant the December Peerless and
accordingly shipped Surat cotton to the buyer on that ship. The buyer meant
the October Peerless and refused to accept the cotton shipped on the De-
cember Peerless. " The seller sued for breach of contract. The court held for
the buyer on the ground that there was no "consensus ad idem [meeting of
the minds]," so that no contract was formed." Principle II is adopted in the
Second Restatement section 20(1):
There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties
attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and
(a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached
by the other; or
(b) each party knows or each party has reason to know the meaning
attached by the other.3
Principle II applies only if both parties are either fault free or equally at
fault. In Peerless itself, it is likely that both parties were equally at fault.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2)(b) (1981).
34. See 2 H & C 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
35. Id. at 375.
36. The facts are as stated in the buyer's answer, to which the seller demurred. Id.
37. Id. at 376.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(1).
1423June 2009]
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A.W. Brian Simpson found that at the time of the case, ships commonly
shared names, and there were reports of at least eleven ships called Peerless
that were sailing the seas.39 Ships bearing the same name could be differen-
tiated by using their unique registration numbers or, much more commonly,
by the names of their captains.40 On these facts, the buyer and the seller in
Peerless were equally careless in assuming that the term Peerless was un-
ambiguous.
Principle IL If contracting parties subjectively attached the
same meaning to an expression, that meaning prevails even though
it is unreasonable.
Where both parties negligently attached the same (unreasonable) mean-
ing to an expression, both parties are at fault, but the fault has caused no
injury. Rather, a party would be morally at fault to later claim a meaning
that she herself did not attach to the expression. Principle III is adopted in
section 201(1) of the Second Restatement. That section provides that
"[w]here the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agree-
ment or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.', '
Principle IV If contracting parties, A and B, attached different
meanings, m and n, to an expression, and A knew that B attached
meaning n, while B did not know that A attached meaning m, mean-
ing n prevails even if it is less reasonable than meaning m.
Principle IV is adopted in section 201(2)(a) of the Second Restatement:
Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agree-
ment or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning
attached by one of them if at the time the agreement was made ... that
party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the
41
other knew the meaning attached by the first party ....
Although Principle IV allows a negligently adopted meaning to prevail,
it is supported by a fault analysis. B may have been negligent in attaching
meaning n to the expression, but A was at greater fault in allowing B to pro-
ceed on the basis of the interpretation that A knew B unreasonably, but
actually, held. A's greater fault outweighs B's negligence.
In sum, when parties assign different meanings to contractual expres-
sions, blameworthiness-in the form of either morally wrongful behavior or
negligence (itself a special kind of moral fault)-plays a key role in deter-
mining which meaning prevails.
39. A.W. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peer-
less, II CARDOzo L. REV. 287, 295 (1989).
40. Id.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1).
42. Id. § 201(2).
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IV. MISTAKE
Mistake, like interpretation, is an area of contract law in which both neg-
ligence and strong moral fault are salient.43 Traditionally, contract law has
recognized several categories of mistake, one of which is known as unilat-
eral mistake. The term unilateral mistake normally refers to transient,
mechanical errors. A common type of mistake in everyday life consists of
physical blunders, like spilling coffee. This type of mistake, although mani-
fested externally, normally results from an error in the mechanics of an
actor's mental machinery, such as a lapse of concentration, a spatial or
physical misconception, or a slip in hand-eye coordination. A counterpart of
such physical blunders consists of intellectual blunders that result from
comparable errors. For example, as a result of an error in the mechanics of
an actor's mental machinery, the actor may write "65" when she intends to
write "56," or may make an error in addition.
Characterizing these kinds of blunders as mistakes assumes that for the
actor in question the blunder is transient. If an actor spilled every cup of
coffee he handled, we would not characterize his spills as mistakes. Instead
we would say that he had some type of disability. The same is true if an ac-
tor wrote all numbers backward or was unable to add correctly. I will call
mistakes of this kind-that is, blunders that result from transient errors in
the actor's mental machinery-mechanical errors. Among the most common
types of mechanical errors are mistaken computations, mistaken payments,
misidentifications of property that is to be bought and sold, auditory or vis-
ual misperceptions, and misunderstandings of specifications, formulas, or
plans. Mechanical errors resemble the kind of mistakes sometimes made in
the transcription of DNA. Almost invariably, that transcription is correct.
But every once in a while, it goes awry.
A. The Paradigm Case: The Nonmistaken Party Is Aware
of the Mistaken Party's Mechanical Error
I begin with the paradigm case, in which the nonmistaken party, B, is
aware of the mechanical error that was made by the mistaken party, A. In
that case, the mistaken party should have no contractual liability. It is true
that in the event of a mechanical error, normally the mistaken party is at
fault, because she did not exercise due care. In the paradigm case, however,
B would be more strongly at fault if he tried to take advantage of this kind of
error. Of course, B might have formed an expectation that by concluding a
contract he could benefit from A's mistake. As a matter of morality, how-
ever, if that was B's intention he would be viewed as improperly taking
advantage of A. His expectation would be unjustified, like the expectation of
a person who finds lost property and knows who the owner is, but thinks
that he is entitled to benefit from the owner's carelessness-"Finders
43. Part IV draws on arguments I previously made in Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Con-
tract Law, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1573 (2003).
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Keepers." Judge Posner's analysis of a case involving postcontract conduct
is applicable here by analogy:
[I]t is one thing to say that you can exploit your superior knowledge of the
market-for if you cannot, you will not be able to recoup the investment
you made in obtaining that knowledge .... It is another thing to say that
you can take deliberate advantage of an oversight by your contract partner
concerning his rights under the contract. Such taking advantage is not the
exploitation of superior knowledge or the avoidance of unbargained-for
expense; it is sharp dealing. Like theft, it has no social product, and also
like theft it induces costly defensive expenditures, in the form of overe-
laborate disclaimers or investigations into the trustworthiness of a
prospective contract partner, just as the prospect of theft induces expendi-
tures on locks.4
This position is adopted in section 153 of the Second Restatement and in
many cases. An offeree cannot snap up an offer that is too good to be true.45
B. The Nonmistaken Party Had Reason to Know
of the Mistaken Party's Mechanical Error
Suppose that the nonmistaken party is not proven to have been aware of
a mechanical error, but had reason to know of the error. Here the fault analy-
sis is not as clear as it is in the paradigm case. In the paradigm case, B
knowingly attempts to take advantage of A's mechanical error; in the rea-
son-to-know case, he does not. Nevertheless, although A is at fault for
making the mistake, B is at fault for his negligence in failing to realize that a
mistake was made when a reasonable person would have done so. Further-
more, administrability considerations strongly favor relief in the reason-to-
know case. Only the nonmistaken party knows with certainty whether he
was actually aware of a mechanical error. Proving actual (subjective) aware-
ness by the nonmistaken party therefore will usually be too difficult a
burden for the mistaken party to shoulder. Where the nonmistaken party had
reason to know of a mechanical error, he probably did know. Accordingly,
the reason-to-know case should be treated like the paradigm case to protect
the integrity of the rule that governs that case.
C. Cases in Which the Nonmistaken Party Neither Knew nor
Had Reason to Know of the Mechanical Error
Suppose the nonmistaken party, B, did not know or have reason to know
of the mechanical error made by the mistaken party, A. This kind of case
presents two issues. First, should A be liable for B's reliance damages? Sec-
ond, should A be liable for B's expectation damages?
44. Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Braunstein, 75 F. Supp. 137, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Speckel v.
Perkins, 364 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); see also I SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGE J.
THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 94, at 297 (rev. ed. 1936).
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In the paradigm case, where B is aware of A's mechanical error, B's reli-
ance should make no difference. If B is aware that A made a mechanical
error, B's reliance is unjustified. However, if B relies when he is neither
aware nor has reason to be aware that A made a mechanical error, then B's
reliance is justified; A's fault has caused a loss to B; and at a minimum, A
should compensate B for that loss by paying reliance damages.
Whether the mistaken party should be liable for expectation damages in
such a case is a more difficult issue. Older contract law took the position
that a mechanical error (or, in the traditional nomenclature, a unilateral mis-
take) was not a defense against expectation damages unless the nonmistaken
party either knew or had reason to know of the mistake.46 In contrast, mod-
em contract law takes the position that a mechanical error is a defense to
expectation damages, at least where the result of enforcing the contract
through expectation damages would be "unconscionable.
4
1
It is true that where B neither was aware nor should have been aware of
the mistake, A is at fault, and B has formed a justified expectation as a result
of A's fault. That, however, is not dispositive. For example, if A negligently
makes a mistaken payment to B, and B neither knows nor has reason to
know that a payment is mistaken, then as a result of A's fault B may form a
justified expectation that the payment is his to keep. However, that expecta-
tion is not protected by the law. 8 Similarly, where A has negligently lost
personal property and B, who finds the property, reasonably believes that the
property was abandoned, B forms a justified expectation that the property is
now his. Again, however, that expectation is not protected.
As in those cases, the fact that the nonmistaken party in a mechanical-
error case formed a justified expectation does not mean that he acts fairly in
insisting on full enforcement of the contract after he understands that his
counterparty had made such an error. On the contrary, just as a payee is
morally obliged to return a mistaken payment once he learns the payment
was mistaken, and a finder is morally obliged to return lost property once he
knows that it was lost rather than abandoned, so too a party to a contract that
is based on a mechanical error would be morally overreaching if he insisted
on full enforcement after he learned of the error. This principle is embodied
49in section 153 of the Second Restatement and the modem cases.
Normally, the principle of unconscionability is applied ex ante, at the
time a bargain is made, to determine whether the bargaining process, the
bargain, or both conformed to moral standards. In the context of mechanical
errors, however, the concept of unconscionability refers to cases where it is
46. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1978).
47. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153(a) (1981).
48. See, e.g., Glover v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 664 F.2d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 1981) ("In all the
circumstances, it would be unjust, in our view, for [an unknowing mistaken payee] to keep the
money. This result disappoints an expectation on her part that she had every reason to believe, at one
time, to be legitimate, but to decide otherwise would be intolerably unfair to [the mistaken payor].").
49. See Donovan v. RRL Corp., 27 P.3d 702 (Cal. 2001).
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morally improper to seek full enforcement of a promise that was based on
such an error50 In these cases, the nonmistaken party will be restored to his
precontract wealth by an award of reliance damages. A fair-minded person
who has been made whole in this way would not try to take advantage of a
mechanical error by inflicting a further loss on the mistaken party so as to
make a gain that is not earned by knowledge, skill, or diligence. As in other
areas of contract law, therefore, fault should and does play a significant role
in the outcomes in at least this category of mistake cases.
V. NONPERFORMANCE
The subjects discussed in Parts I through IV do not exhaust the areas of
contract law in which fault plays a significant role. Other such areas are-to
name just a few-fraud, duress, undue influence, and the duty to perform in
good faith. Of course, some rules of contract law turn exclusively on policy
and empirical considerations. Examples are the mailbox rule, the parol evi-
dence rule, and the Statute of Frauds. In still other areas, such as disclosure,
fault considerations are largely although not entirely trumped by policy con-
siderations. However, the existence of some contract-law rules that are not
driven by fault does not mean that contract law is not fault based, any more
than the existence of some strict-liability rules in tort law means that tort
law is not fault based.
Why, then, do various authorities conclude that contract law is based on
strict liability, not fault? Perhaps these authorities have in mind not contract
law but rather one area of contract law: liability for nonperformance of a
bargain promise. The idea that liability in this area is strict, not fault based,
has a superficial appeal. In torts, the plaintiff normally prevails only if the
defendant acted wrongfully by intentionally inflicting an injury or failing to
exercise due care. In contracts, the plaintiff normally prevails if a contract
was formed and the defendant did not perform her part of the contract. It is
therefore tempting to reach the conclusion that liability in contract for non-
performance is strict, and is based on policy reasons rather than moral
reasons.
However, this is an oversimplified view of the morality of promising and
the basis of liability for nonperformance. In the area of nonperformance, law
and morality, although not identical, tend to converge rather than diverge.
Morally, a promise is a commitment to take a certain action, such as the
achievement of a given result, even if at the time the action is to be taken,
the promisor would prefer not to fulfill her promise, all things considered.
The mere fact that a promisor has not intentionally or negligently failed to
perform is not a moral excuse for nonperformance, because the moral com-
mitment of a promisor extends further. Neither is it a moral excuse for
nonperformance that when the time comes to perform the promise, it would
50. McMaster Univ. v. W.ilchar Constr. Ltd., [1971] 3 O.R. 801, 811 (Can.); see also Stepps
lnvs. Ltd. v. Sec. Capital Corp., [1976] 14 O.R.2d 259, 271 (Can.).
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hurt to do so. To believe that any of these reasons are moral excuses for not
performing a promise would be to misunderstand the nature of promising.
On the other hand, nonperformance of a promise is morally permissible
if there is a moral excuse for not performing. One such excuse is that per-
formance would not only hurt, but hurt very badly. As Thomas Scanlon says,
Saying "I promise to..." normally binds one to do the thing promised, but
it does not bind unconditionally or absolutely.... It does not bind abso-
lutely because, while a promise binds one against reconsidering one's
intention simply on grounds of one's own convenience, it does not bind
one to do the thing promised whatever the cost to oneself and others.5'
Similarly, the fact that performance of a promise hurts very badly may be a
legal excuse under the doctrine of impracticability, which rests in significant
part on whether a promised performance has become much more costly than
was contemplated at the time of contract formation.
More generally, it is inaccurate to say that liability for nonperformance
is established by showing contract formation and nonperformance. To these
elements must be added the lack of an excuse for nonperformance. The legal
structure of liability for nonperformance builds on the moral structure of
promising, and neither the moral nor the legal obligation is an example of
strict liability. If I promise you that I will meet you for lunch and I don't
show up, I am at fault, and "strict liability" doesn't enter the picture. The
same is true if I promise to sell you one hundred widgets and don't deliver.
Of course, in the lunch hypothetical, if I have a good excuse for not showing
up-for example, if I suddenly fell ill-I wouldn't be at fault. Similarly, if I
have a good excuse for not delivering the widgets, such as a blockade or a
fire, I won't be liable. It's true that what constitutes a good excuse in the
widgets hypothetical may be different from what constitutes a good excuse
in the lunch hypothetical, but that is largely because of the different context
and subject matter, not because one nonperformance is judged under a fault
standard and the other is judged under a strict liability standard.
The fault basis of liability for contractual nonperformance is well sum-
marized by Barry Nicholas:
Fault is ... absent from the conventional common law conception of liabil-
ity for breach of contract only because it is in substance incorporated in the
meaning of 'contract'. So in a formulation such as that in Restatement 2d
Contracts, § 235(2): 'When performance of a duty under a contract is due
any non-performance is a breach', the part played by fault is incorporated
in the duty.
52
51. Thomas M. Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PMiL. & PUB. AFF. 199, 214 (1990).
52. Barry Nicholas, Fault and Breach of Contract, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT
LAW 337, 345 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995).
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CONCLUSION
It is not surprising that fault plays a significant role in contract law. On
the contrary, it would be surprising if it didn't. For one thing, moral norms
are basic building blocks in all fields of law. For another, the efficiency of
the contracting system would be materially impaired if fault did not play a
significant role. The efficiency of that system rests on a tripod whose legs
are legal remedies, reputational effects, and the internalization of social
norms-in particular, the moral norm of promise keeping. These three legs
are mutually supportive. Legal rules rest in significant part on social norms,
reputational effects rest in significant part on social norms, and social norms
are reinforced by legal rules and reputational effects.
All three of these legs are necessary to ensure the reliability, and there-
fore the efficiency, of the contracting system. Legal rules are not alone
sufficient, because dispute settlement under law is expensive and chancy.
The moral norm of promise keeping is not alone sufficient, because not all
actors fully internalize moral norms. And reputational effects are not alone
sufficient, because reliable information concerning a promisor's history of
breach is often hard to come by and often disregarded even when known.
Because all three legs are necessary to support the efficiency of the con-
tracting system, anything that weakens one leg seriously threatens the
efficiency of that system. Giving effect to a theory that fault does not play
an important role in contract law would remove the moral force of promis-
ing in a bargain context and would thereby decrease the efficiency of the
contracting system in three ways. First, it would lead contracting parties to
make greater use of costly noncontractual measures, such as security depos-
its, to ensure performance. Second, it would diminish the force of
reputational constraints, because such constraints rest in significant part on
moral norms. Finally, and most importantly, it would increase the need to
resort to litigation, which is very expensive, as opposed to achieving per-
formance of contracts through the internalization of the moral norm of
promise keeping, which is very inexpensive.
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